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I. INTRODUCTION 
Carol is fifty-three and has cancer that has metastasized to her brain 
and liver.1  She is enrolled in Medicaid.2  Her long-term primary care 
physician recently informed her that she is no longer treating Medicaid 
patients.3  Randy is forty-six and has been unemployed for fifteen 
months.4  He is enrolled in Medicaid and in desperate need of a root 
canal.5  His local dentist recently informed him that Medicaid no longer 
covers the procedure.6  Shannon has an eight-year-old son who needs his 
tonsils and adenoids removed.7  He is enrolled in Medicaid.8  
Unfortunately, the nearest specialist that accepts Medicaid patients is 
more than two hours away.9 
Due to the current financial crisis, states are cutting Medicaid to 
balance financially-strained state budgets.10  Some states are taking a 
hard look at opting out of Medicaid altogether.11  On March 23, 2010, 
President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(The Affordable Care Act),12 which adds approximately seventeen 
million new beneficiaries to already strained Medicaid rolls.13  Despite 
this mandate, Congress has failed to enact fundamental reimbursement 
reforms needed to assure access to quality care.14 
                                                                                                                                     
 1 Steven Sack, As Medicaid Payments Shrink, Patients Are Abandoned, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/health/policy/16medicaid.html. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Sack, supra note 1. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Marilyn Werber Serafini and Julie Appleby, States May Face Showdown With 
Feds Over Cutting Medicaid Rolls, KAISER HEALTH NEWS, Feb. 3, 2011, 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/January/28/medicaid-maintenance-of-
effort.aspx. 
 11 Althea Fung, Texas Considers Opting Out of Medicaid, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Nov. 
15, 2010, http://www.nationaljournal.com/texas-considers-opting-out-of-medicaid-
20101115.; David McGrath Schwartz, Wary of Health Care Reform, Gibbons Weighs 
Rejecting Federal Medicaid Funds, LAS VEGAS SUN, Jan. 15, 2010, 
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/jan/15/wary-health-care-reform-gibbons-
weighs-rejecting-f/. 
 12 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010). 
 13 Karyn Schwartz & Anthony Damico, EXPANDING MEDICAID: COVERAGE FOR LOW-
INCOME ADULTS UNDER HEALTH REFORM 1, 1 (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 
2010). 
 14 David Hogberg, ObamaCare Rules For Paying Doctors Might Spur Exodus, 
INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY, Mar. 30, 2010, 
http://www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Article.aspx?id=528916; Pay Wechsler & 
Chad Terhune, Dr. Orr Begins Home Pilot as Health Law Brings Medicaid Surge, 
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For example, Medicaid reimbursement rates are still well below 
those of Medicare and private insurance.15  The Affordable Care Act and 
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 make strides 
towards increasing access by tying Medicaid rates to Medicare 
reimbursement; however, the rate match applies only to care furnished 
by primary care physicians in 2013 and 2014.16  Moreover, the scope of 
Medicaid providers classified as primary care physicians is narrow17  and 
does not include care providers in the most needed specialty practices.   
Thus, even after the passage of the Affordable Care Act, patients 
continue to face a two-tiered payment system resulting in disparities in 
access to care.  This Comment explores Medicaid’s Equal Access 
provision,18 also known as § 30A, which Congress enacted to assure 
access to care among Medicaid beneficiaries.19  This broad and worthy 
goal has run into multiple road blocks in the hands of the judiciary, and 
Congress has been quite slow to respond.20 
Traditionally, providers and beneficiaries could enforce the Equal 
Access provision under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a civil rights claim by 
asserting that Medicaid reimbursement was so low that it discouraged 
provider participation and detrimentally impacted access to care.21  In the 
                                                                                                                                     
BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 31, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-31/dr-orr-
begins-home-pilot-as-health-law-brings-medicaid-surge.html.; John V. Jacobi, Medicaid 
Cuts: Where’s the Outrage?, HEALTH REFORM WATCH (March 16, 2010), 
http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2010/03/16/medicaid-cuts-where%e2%80%99s-the-
outrage/ (“If Medicare services or provider rates were cut, or threatened to be cut to 
balance the budget, the firestorm would be epic.  Republicans would accuse Democrats 
suggesting such cuts of stealing from the elderly.  Democrats would accuse Republicans 
suggesting such cuts of trying to abolish Medicare.  AARP would express outrage, and if 
it didn’t do so loudly enough tea partiers would urge seniors to burn their AARP cards in 
an incongruous support of a government health care program.  So where’s the outrage 
when states faced with budget cuts look first to cut Medicare’s sister program, 
Medicaid?”). 
 15 See Stephen Zuckerman, Aimee F. Williams & Karen E. Stockley, Trends in 
Medicaid Physician Fees, 2003-2008, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS 510, 517 (Apr. 2009). 
 16 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 
1029. 
 17 Id. (matching Medicaid payments for family medicine, general internal medicine, 
and pediatric medicine at 100% or more of Medicare payments for primary care). 
 18 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(30)(A) (2006); see Part III infra. 
 19 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(30)(A). 
 20 Abigail R. Moncrieff, Payments to Medicaid Doctors: Interpreting the “Equal 
Access” Provision, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 673, 677 (2006); Edward Alan Miller, Federal 
Administrative and Judicial Oversight of Medicaid: Policy Legacies and Tandem 
Institutions under the Boren Amendment, PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM (2007); 
Jacobi, supra note 14. 
 21 Pre-Gonzaga, a circuit split existed regarding whether providers or beneficiaries 
could enforce the equal access provision using 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Compare Pa. 
Pharmacists Ass’n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531 (3d Cir. 2002), and Walgreen Co. v. Hood, 
275 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that providers are not intended beneficiaries and do 
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1990s, a circuit split developed regarding the provision’s interpretation.22  
After the landmark decision by the Supreme Court in Gonzaga 
University v. Doe,23 providers and beneficiaries seeking to enforce the 
Equal Access provision pursuant to § 1983 have achieved success in only 
one circuit, leaving five sister circuits that refuse to recognize a cause of 
action.24  Now, rather than filing suit under § 1983, providers and 
patients are seeking to enforce § 30A under the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution.25  Having achieved success under this novel 
cause of action,26 courts are being asked to re-examine a revived pre-
Gonzaga circuit split with respect to the statute’s interpretation.  The 
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to hear a case addressing 
whether providers and patients have a cause of action under the 
Supremacy Clause to enforce the Equal Access provision.27  The Court, 
however, declined to hear argument regarding the interpretation of the 
statue.28  The Court will hear oral argument with respect to the ability to 
enforce the Medicaid statute via the Supremacy Clause during its 2011 
term.29 
                                                                                                                                     
not have a cause of action under § 1983 to enforce § 30(A)), with Visiting Nurse Ass’n of 
N. Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 1004 (1st Cir. 1996), Methodist Hosp., Inc. v. 
Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 1996), and Ark. Med. Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 
F.3d 519, 526 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that providers have a cause of action under § 1983 
to enforce 30(A)).  See also Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(hearing and deciding in favor of a provider (hospital) based on a § 1983 cause of action 
seeking to enforce 30(A), but never addressing the hospital’s right to sue as a provider). 
 22 Compare Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998), Minn. Homecare Ass’n v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 917, 918 (8th 
Cir. 1997), and Ark. Med. Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 51, 530 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting 
that § 30(A) is a procedural standard that requires a study), with Evergreen Presbyterian 
Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 933 (5th Cir. 2000), Rite Aid, Inc. v. Houstoun, 
171 F.3d 842 (3d Cir. 1999), and Methodist Hosps, Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1030 
(7th Cir. 1996)(noting that § 30(A) is not procedural and does not require a study but a 
substantive result). 
 23 536 U.S. 273 (2002). 
 24 Compare Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2007), 
Mandy R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006), Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 
454 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2006), Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2005), and 
Long Term Care Pharm. Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2004), with Pediatric 
Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2006), 
vacated on other grounds, Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 551 U.S. 1142 (2007). 
 25 Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, 
Conn. Assoc. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Rell, No: 3:10-CV-136 (D. Conn. Feb. 16, 
2010). 
 26 Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 27 Maxwell-Jolly v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3349 (2010). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rosa Mem. Hosp., No. 10-283, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 735, 735 
(Jan. 18, 2011). 
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This Comment, in Part II, provides a brief overview of the United 
States health care system, including the Medicaid program and in Part 
III, offers an analysis of the Equal Access provision.  Part IV examines 
the willingness of several circuits to enforce the provision under § 1983, 
as well as their eventual retreat.  Part V provides a brief overview of the 
ability to enforce federal law, including the Equal Access provision, 
under the Supremacy Clause.  Finally, Part VI calls for Congress to 
extend a private right of action to providers and beneficiaries allowing 
private enforcement of Medicaid’s requirements and urges Congress to 
provide states the option of accepting universal, federal rates, thus 
discharging any liability under a private cause of action.  Part VI also 
urges Congress to expand and implement the accountable care 
organization concept at the state-wide level in order to assure access to 
quality care. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
A. Health Care Spending: Costs and Coverage 
Health care spending in the United States is projected to reach 
19.3% of gross domestic product in 2019.30  Recently, health spending 
was evenly split between the private and public sectors; but public 
spending will likely comprise more than half of overall health 
expenditures in 2012.31  Private sector spending consists of private 
insurance,32 out-of-pocket payments,33 philanthropy, and charity care.34  
Public sector health spending consists of Medicare and Medicaid,35 
                                                                                                                                     
 30 CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, 
NATIONAL HEALTH STATISTICS GROUP, NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 
2009-2019 (2010); THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE 
COSTS AND SPENDING (March 2009) (noting health spending includes public and private 
expenditures and amounts to approximately $2.5 trillion, or $8,160 per U.S. resident). 
 31 Christopher J. Truffer, Sean Keehan, Sheila Smith, Jonathan Cylus, Andrea Sisko, 
John A Poisal, Joseph Lizkonits & M. Kent Clemens, Health Spending Projections 
Through 2019: The Recession’s Impact Continues, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1, 1 (Feb. 2010) 
(noting the recession, rising unemployment, the aging baby boom population, and 
changing demographics are all predicted to influence health spending over the upcoming 
decade); 
32  THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE COSTS AND 
SPENDING (March 2009) (noting that private insurance payments constitute 64% of 
private sector spending). 
 33 Id. (noting that out-of-pocket payments constitute 22% of private sector spending). 
 34 Id. (noting that other expenditures constitute 13% of private sector spending). 
 35 JENNIFER JENSON, GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON HEALTH CARE BENEFITS AND 
PROGRAMS: A DATA BRIEF 1, 5 (Congressional Research Service June 16, 2008) (noting 
just under $1 trillion in public funds were allocated to health spending in 2006.  Of this 
amount, approximately 73% was spent on Medicare and Medicaid). 
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veterans and employee benefits,36 research grants, and local public health 
programs.37  Due to spiraling costs, these programs are embroiled in the 
controversy surrounding health care reform.38  As noted by President 
Obama, “[a]lmost all of the long-term deficit and debt that we face 
relates to the exploding costs of Medicare and Medicaid . . . .  And if we 
don’t get control over that we can’t get control over our federal 
budget.”39 
The two largest components of public health spending are 
Medicare, which provides medical assistance to those over sixty-five,40 
and Medicaid, which provides assistance for the categorically needy.41  
Effective 2014, all individuals with an income of less than 133% of the 
poverty level will be eligible for Medicaid.42  Currently, those not 
eligible for medical assistance from a publicly-funded program can 
obtain insurance through employers, in the private market, or remain 
uninsured.43  Effective 2014, all individuals will be required to obtain 
health insurance.44 
                                                                                                                                     
 36 Id. (noting that approximately 6% of overall public health spending was for federal 
employees, military personnel, and retirees in 2007). 
 37 Id. (noting that approximately 21% of overall public health spending was for other 
expenditures such as SCHIP, the NIH, the FDA, Research, and State and Federal Public 
health activity in 2007). 
 38 Transcript of Bipartisan Healthcare Summit (Feb. 26, 2010), 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2010/February/25/health-care-reform-
transcript.aspx [hereinafter Healthcare Summit]. 
 39 Id. 
 40 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2006).  Individuals 65 or over are eligible as well as those with 
end stage renal disease, provided that the individual also meets certain additional 
requirements such as citizenship or residency and employment tax provisions.  Id. 
 41 Id. § 1396a(10)(A).  Medicaid eligibility must be granted based on financial 
criteria to those belonging to a categorical group such as children, parents with dependent 
children, pregnant women, and people with severe disabilities.  Id. 
 42 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010). 
 43 CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, THE NUMBER OF UNINSURED 
AMERICANS IS AT AN ALL-TIME HIGH 1, 2 (2006).  The uninsured population was 
approximately 46.6 million or 15.9% of the population in 2006.  Id.  The employer-
sponsored and individually-purchased market covered approximately 150 million or 68% 
of the population in 1996.  Id. 
 44 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010).  
Compare Thomas More Law Ctr v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (2010) (finding 
minimum coverage constitutional) and Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 125922 (Nov. 30, 2010) (finding minimum coverage provision constitutional), 
with Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22464 
(Mar. 3, 2011) (finding minimum coverage provision unconstitutional) and Virginia v. 
Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (2010) (finding minimum coverage provision 
unconstitutional). 
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Approximately 25% of Americans are enrolled in Medicare or 
Medicaid.45  Enrollment is evenly split between the two programs, with 
some populations covered by both.46  Due to the recent economic 
recession, the aging baby boom population, and the Affordable Care Act, 
enrollment in public programs is predicted to increase substantially.47 
B.  Federal and State Control 
Under the current statutory framework, the federal and state 
governments are required to provide medical assistance to eligible 
providers and beneficiaries.48  Medicare is a federal program 
administered by the federal government, while Medicaid is a federal and 
state partnership administered by the states.49  The Medicaid Act is a 
conditional spending statute that sets forth a federal framework in which 
each state voluntarily agrees to implement a public health program 
according to federal standards.50  In return for their participation, states 
receive federal financial support.51  As Medicaid populations increase 
and state budgets dwindle, every state that participates in the program is 
obligated to maintain a federally-mandated level of care.52 
Unlike the federal government, state governments are generally 
bound by state constitutions that require a balanced budget.53  According 
to the National Association of State Medicaid Directors, state budgets 
shortfalls in 2011 will total $140 billion.54  Due to limited resources and 
burgeoning obligations, states are looking to cut expenditures, and many 
are looking to cut Medicaid.55  Medicaid cuts will likely impact the 
access to and the quality of the care available to the neediest 
populations.56 
                                                                                                                                     
 45 CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, THE NUMBER OF UNINSURED 
AMERICANS IS AT AN ALL-TIME HIGH 1, 2 (2006). 
 46 Id. 
 47 TRUFFER ET AL., supra note 31, at 1. 
 48 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006). 
 49 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id.  For an in depth discussion, see Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid 
at Thirty-Five, 45 ST. LOUIS L.J. 7 (2001). 
 52 Id. § 1396a(30)(A). 
 53 RONALD SNELL, STATE BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS: PROVISIONS AND 
PRACTICE (National Conference of State Legislatures 2004). 
 54 Kevin Sack & Robert Pear, States Consider Medicaid Cuts as Use Grows, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/us/politics/19medicaid.html. 
 55 Id.  
 56 Zuckerman, et al., supra note 15, at 517; see Sack & Pear, supra note 54. 
484 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 7:477 
C. Medicaid 
Congress enacted Medicaid under Title XIX of the Social Security 
Act in 1965.57  It is now the largest means-tested entitlement program in 
the country.58  As of mid-2010, all fifty states had voluntarily agreed to 
participate in the program.59  Of the approximately sixty million 
Medicaid enrollees, half are children, accounting for $49 billion in 
Medicaid expenditures. 60  In contrast, 10% of enrollees are elderly and 
account for $77 billion in Medicaid spending.61  Long-term care makes 
up almost one-third of total Medicaid expenditures, accounting for close 
to half of all long-term care expenditures in the United States.62  
Individuals with disabilities account for approximately 42% of total 
Medicaid spending.63 
In order to receive federal funds under Medicaid, a state must 
submit a “state plan” for providing “medical assistance” to eligible 
beneficiaries.64  The definition of “medical assistance” is unclear, and 
thus, a circuit split has developed regarding its interpretation.65  
Participating states are required to establish or designate a “single state 
agency” to supervise the administration of the state plan that must 
comply with statutory requirements established by the federal 
                                                                                                                                     
 57 See Grants to States for Medical Assistance Programs Act (the Medicaid Act), 
Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq.). 
 58 Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 51, at 7. 
 59 See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICAID: A PRIMER: KEY 
INFORMATION ON THE NATION’S HEALTH PROGRAM FOR LOW-INCOME PEOPLE 4 (2009) 
[hereinafter KAISER FOUNDATION].  
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 JUDITH FEDER, HARRIET L. KOMISAR, ROBERT B. FRIEDLAND, LONG-TERM CARE 
FINANCING: POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 33 (Georgetown University Long-Term 
Care Financing Project 2007). 
 63 Id. (stating that individuals with disabilities account for 14% of enrollees and 
account for $115.5 billion) 
 64 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006); Jane Perkins, Symposium: Barriers to Access to Health 
Care: Medicaid: Past Successes and Future Challenges, 12 Health Matrix 7, 9–10 
(Winter 2002). 
 65 Compare Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 910 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting 
that medical assistance is solely financial), with Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79 (1st 
Cir. 2002), and Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that medical 
assistance means more than financial assistance including actual services).  See Alison C. 
Sorkin, Financial Assistance For Medicaid’s Continued Existence: The Need For The 
United States Supreme Court To Adopt The Tenth Circuit’s Definition of Medical 
Assistance, 85 DENV. U.L. REV. 725, 745–51 (2008) (arguing that medical assistance 
should mean financial assistance); Kenneth R. Wiggins, Medicaid and the enforceable 
Right to Receive Medical Assistance: The Need For A Definition of “Medical 
Assistance”, 47 WM AND MARY L. REV. 1487, 1512 (2006) (arguing that a blanket 
definition as financial and actual services is not practical). 
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government.66  For example, states must provide certain types of care67 
and abide by the statutory eligibility criteria.68  Overall, the Medicaid Act 
and its regulations provide states a degree of flexibility in determining 
eligibility, benefits, and reimbursement rates.69 
When states participate in the program, the federal government 
matches a percentage of the state’s Medicaid expenditures.70  This is 
called the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP).71  There is no 
upper limit on the amount the federal government spends on Medicaid 
because its matching FMAP portion is wholly dependent on state 
expenditures.72  FMAP ranges from a required minimum of 50% to 
approximately 75%.73  Effective 2014, FMAP will substantially increase 
to cover newly enrolled Medicaid beneficiaries under the Affordable 
Care Act.74  This increase should help states accommodate the increased 
obligation under the health reform legislation. 
To receive medical assistance, eligible patients register with the 
appropriate state agency75 and the state then reimburses providers for 
care.76  Alternatively, states may purchase a managed care plan which 
reimburses providers at a negotiated rate.77  Congress does not require 
private providers to participate in Medicaid, but has instead enacted a 
                                                                                                                                     
 66 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. 
 67 For example, inpatient hospital care, outpatient hospital care, nursing facility care, 
physician services, labs and x-rays, family planning early periodic screening diagnostic, 
and treatment services for those under 21.  Id. § 1392a(10)(A). 
 68 Enrollment is based on categorical and financial eligibility and state 
residency/citizenship.  Id. § 1396a.  Effective 2014, all individuals earning less than 
133% of the poverty line will be eligible for Medicaid.  Id. 
 69 Id.  See Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 51, at 20–25. 
 70 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. 
 71 Id.  See KAISER FOUNDATION, supra note 59, at 19; CHRISTIE PROVOST PETERS, 
FMAP: THE FEDERAL SHARE OF MEDICAID COSTS 1 (The National Health Policy Forum, 
George Washington University Jan. 15, 2009). 
 72 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. 
 73 74 Fed.Reg. 62315-17 (Nov. 27, 2009).  For example, Maryland and 
Massachusetts receive a 50% federal match for state funds spent on medical assistance, 
while Mississippi and West Virginia receive an approximate 75% federal match for state 
funds spent on medical assistance.  Id. 
 74 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010).  FMAP 
for state spending to cover newly eligible Medicaid beneficiaries under the Affordable 
Care Act is 100% in 2014-2016, 95% in 2017, 94% in 2018, 93% in 2019, and 90% in 
2020 and each year thereafter. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, PATIENT 
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: SUMMARY OF COVERAGE PROVISIONS, (2010). 
 75 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. 
 76 Id.  See KAISER FOUNDATION, supra note 59, at 13. 
 77 KAISER FOUNDATION, supra note 59, at 13 (noting that the most common delivery 
system for Medicaid assistance is managed care, with nearly 2/3 enrolled in a form of 
managed care such as a health maintenance organization or primary care case 
management arrangement). 
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flexible statutory framework that allows states to set reimbursement rates 
in order to entice enough providers to assure patients’ access to care.78  
Provider participation is financially motivated,79 and often influenced by 
administrative difficulties and numerous other factors.80  On average, 
physician reimbursement rates for Medicaid are approximately 60% of 
the average private and public rates.81  Consequently, provider 
participation in Medicaid is low, as is access to care.82  
In contrast, many hospitals and facilities are required to provide 
care in particular circumstances under the Hill Burton Act,83 the 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act,84 and state charity care 
                                                                                                                                     
 78 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(30)(A). 
 79 See Zuckerman et al., supra note 15, at 517; Sack, supra note 1; Jacob Goldstein, 
Should Medicaid Pay More for Primary Care?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2010, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2010/01/06/should-medicaid-pay-more-for-primary-care/; 
James A. White, Hey, Docs: Walgreens Also Says Medicaid Doesn’t Pay Enough, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 14, 2010, http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2010/01/14/hey-docs-walgreens-also-
says-medicaid-doesnt-pay-enough/; Jonathon Cohn, On the House: How The Health Care 
Bill Could Make Doctors Richer and Help the Poor, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 5, 2010, 
http://www.tnr.com/article/health-care/the-house. 
 80 See Jessica Greene, Jan Blustein and Beth C. Weitzman, Race, Segregation, and 
Physicians’ Participation in Medicaid, 84 THE MILBANK QUARTERLY 239, 239 (2006) 
(race).  See Peter Margolis, Factors Associated with Pediatricians’ Participation in 
Medicaid in North Carolina, 267 JAMA 1942, 1942 (1992) (cultural barriers and 
misinformed physicians).  See Senator John Barrasso, Health Care Summit (Feb. 25, 
2010) (potential Medicare malpractice liability).  The Senator first noted that “many, 
many doctors . . . take care of everyone, regardless of ability to pay.”  Id.  Then, in 
response to current reform proposals to expand coverage through Medicaid, the Senator 
stated, “to put 15 million more people on Medicaid, a program where many doctors in the 
country do not see them . . . how are you going to help those folks?  And, Mr. President, 
when I talk to doctors, they say, I have a way: Put all the doctors who take care of 
Medicaid patients under the Federal Torts Claim Act.  That will help them, because 
they’re not getting paid enough to see the patients.  But if . . . they accept those patients 
and then their liability insurance is covered under the Federal Tort Claims Act, I think 
you’d have a lot more participation in that program.”  Id. 
 81 See Zuckerman et al., supra note 15, at 510. 
 82 Sean Jessee, Fulfilling the Promise of the Medicaid Act: Why the Equal Access 
Clause Creates Privately Enforceable Rights, 58 EMORY L.J. 791, 796 (2009) (citing 
various studies regarding provider participation in Medicaid including Janet D. Perloff et 
al., Which Physicians Limit Their Medicaid Participation, and Why, 30 Health Servs. 
Res. 7, 7–8, 22 (1995); Christine M. Shaffer, The Impact of Medicaid Reforms & False 
Claims Enforcement: Limiting Access by Discouraging Provider Participation in 
Medicaid Programs, 58 S.C. L. REV. 995, 1002 (2007). 
 83 The Hospital Survey and Construction Act (the Hill-Burton Act), P.L. 79-725 
(1946), required hospitals to provide uncompensated care for 20 years after receiving 
federal funds to modernize hospitals.  The Hill-Burton Program of 1975, Title XVI of the 
Public Health Service Act, provided financial subsidies to health facilities and required 
the participating facilities to provide care uncompensated care to eligible individuals. 
 84 EMTALA, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006), requires that hospitals that accept 
Medicare and have an emergency department provide a medical screening to determine 
whether an emergency medical condition exists, and if so to provide stabilizing treatment. 
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statutes.85  Yet, even when required to provide care, hospitals are not 
immune against inadequate rates and continue to lose approximately 
$0.14 on every dollar spent on Medicaid care.86  For example, private 
insurance has historically paid hospitals twice the amount paid by 
Medicaid and Medicare rates are generally two-thirds higher than 
Medicaid reimbursement.87  This discrepancy has resulted in hospital 
closures in medically underserved areas, limited health care access for 
the poor, and a rise in inadequate care due to inadequate personnel and 
equipment.88 
Under the new reform legislation, the number of individuals 
eligible to enroll in Medicaid will undoubtedly increase.89  Due to a 
variety of political and financial pressures, states are contemplating cuts 
to already low Medicaid reimbursement rates.90  In turn, providers will 
likely file suit to preserve access for Medicaid patients.91  Given the 
economic crisis and Medicaid’s expansion, the courts will continue to be 
at the center of the controversy, namely, the enforceability and 
interpretation of Medicaid’s guarantees.92 
                                                                                                                                     
 85 Many states also mandate that certain types of hospitals provide care regardless of 
an individual’s ability to pay.  See N.J.S.A. 26:28-18 et al. (creating a program to 
reimburse charity care payments).  Finally, while its pervasiveness may be debated, 
bankruptcy certainly plays a role as an alternative health care safety net.  See David 
Dranve & Michael L. Millenson, Medical Bankruptcy: Myth Versus Fact, 25 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 74, 74 (Feb. 2006); Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya Holman, Managing Medical 
Bills on the Brink of Bankruptcy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 239, 240 (2010). 
 86 WILL FOX & JOHN PICKERING, HOSPITAL & PHYSICIAN COST SHIFT: PAYMENT 
LEVEL COMPARISON OF MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND COMMERCIAL PAYERS 5 (Milliman 
Dec. 2008). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid Physician Participation: Patients, Poverty, and 
Physician Self-Interest, 21 AM. J. L. AND MED. 191, 198 (1995). 
 89 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010). 
 90 Sack & Pear, supra note 54. 
 91 Susan Haigh, Nursing Homes Sue State of Connecticut, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 29, 
2010,http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2010921081_apctnursinghomesla
wsuit1stldwritethru.html.   The Connecticut Association of Health Care Facilities filed a 
lawsuit against Gov. M. Jodi Rell in federal court due to the states inadequate nursing 
home Medicaid spending.  Id. 
 92 On average the federal government provides over half of Medicaid funds.  
CHRISTINE SCOTT, FEDERAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PERCENTAGE (FMAP) FOR MEDICAID, 
1 (Congressional Research Service, 2005).  Yet, many financially strapped states argue 
that when Congress increases the number of individuals eligible for Medicaid and 
expands benefits, it does so by simply creating a new set of unfunded mandates.  See 
Kevin Sack & Robert Pear, Governors Fear Medicaid Costs in Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jul. 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/health/policy/20health.html.  In 
response to recent reform proposals to expand Medicaid in order to provide greater 
access to care, Gov. Phil Bredesen of Tennessee stated fears regarding “the mother of all 
unfunded mandates.”  Id.  Similarly, Gov. Chris Gregoire of Washington stated, “[a]s a 
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As one health scholar has suggested, “Medicaid is a program loved 
by few, denigrated by many, and misunderstood by most.”93  
Notwithstanding, many scholars are quick to point out that “Medicaid 
has served as a legislative vehicle for an astonishing range of medical 
and public health initiatives.”94  United States Senator Lamar Alexander 
of Tennessee said that Medicaid’s expansion “dumps 15 to 18 million 
low-income Americans into a Medicaid program that none of us would 
want to be a part of because 50% of doctors won’t see new patients.  So 
it’s like giving someone a ticket to a bus line where the busses only run 
half the time.”95 
Importantly, Medicaid’s Equal Access provision96 requires that 
states “assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and 
quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care 
and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such 
care and services are available to the general population in the 
geographic area.”97  The statute’s goal is to prevent the exact concerns 
expressed by opponents of Medicaid’s expansion.  Thus, if Senator 
Alexander is right—and there is substantial evidence that Medicaid 
participants face significant obstacles to accessing care98—then states are 
violating federal law when they adopt low rates that negatively impact 
access.  Alternatively, the federal law may be so lax in its enforcement 
and mandates that it has become substantively ineffective.  Although the 
Affordable Care Act recognizes disparities in access and seeks to expand 
coverage by increasing Medicaid enrollment, it fails to address 
fundamental problems that arise, at least in part, due to limited federal 
oversight and low state reimbursement rates creating a two-tiered, 
                                                                                                                                     
governor, my concern is that is we try to cost-shift to the states we’re not going to be in a 
position to pick up the tab.”  Id. 
 93 Alan Weil, There’s Something About Medicaid, 22 HEALTH AFFAIRS 13, 15 
(Jan./Feb. 2003). 
 94 Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 51, at 9 (noting the reduction of infant 
mortality among low income populations, the improvement of community based long-
term care for the elderly and disabled, the provision of insurance for low income 
individuals, aid to safety-net hospitals, and coverage with of women with breast and 
cervical cancer). 
 95 Senator Lamar Alexander, Healthcare Summit, supra note 38. 
 96 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(30(A)) (2006).  See Part III, infra. 
 97 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(30)(A).  For a general discussion see Watson, supra note 88. 
 98 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES AND ACCESS 
TO CARE, (October 2009); Donald B. Marron, Acting Director of the Congressional 
Budget Office, CBO Testimony regarding Medicaid Spending Growth and Options for 
Controlling Costs before the United States Senate Special Committee on Aging 17 (Jul. 
13, 2006), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/73xx/doc7387/07-13-Medicaid.pdf. 
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fragmented system of care.99  In order to ensure access to quality care for 
the newly covered Medicaid beneficiaries, it is crucial to reform 
Medicaid’s reimbursement and enforcement mechanisms, specifically 
the Equal Access provision.                 
III. THE EQUAL ACCESS PROVISION: 42 U.S.C. § 1396A (30)(A) 
From 1965 to 1972, the federal government rarely reviewed 
Medicaid reimbursement rates set by the states.100  After 1972, Congress 
required states to pay rates set by the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) based on the Medicare program.101  In order to 
encourage greater flexibility in state decision-making, Congress amended 
this requirement, enacting the Boren Amendment in 1980.102  The Boren 
Amendment required states to adopt rates that were “reasonable and 
adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and 
economically operated facilities.”103  In 1997, Congress repealed the 
Boren Amendment which “in essence . . . allowed states to divorce 
Medicaid rates from the cost of care, possibly further restricting the rates 
paid to hospitals for services to Medicaid patients.”104 
In 1989, Congress enacted the Equal Access provision (“§ 
30(A)”).105  Like the Boren Amendment, § 30(A) regulates state 
Medicaid rates.106  Unlike the Boren Amendment, § 30(A) focuses 
primarily on access rather than costs.107  Initially, language similar to that 
                                                                                                                                     
 99 Dennis G. Smith, Medicaid Expansion Ignore States’ Fiscal Crises, The Heritage 
Foundation, Jan. 5, 2010, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/01/Medicaid-
Expansion-Ignores-States-Fiscal-Crises.  See Healthcare Summit, supra note 38.  U.S. 
Representative Peter Roskram stated, “I think one of the problems, to get to this coverage 
issue, is that the premise of this bill is that coverage is expanded through Medicaid, 
welfare.”  Id. 
 100 Edward A. Alan, Federal Administrative and Judicial Oversight of Medicaid: 
Policy Legacies and Tandem Institutions under the Boren Amendment, 38 PUBLIUS: THE 
JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 315, 321 (2007). 
 101 For an in depth discussion, see Rosemary H. Ratcliff, The Mistakes of Medicaid: 
Provider Payment During the Past Decade and Lessons For Health Care Reform in the 
21st Century, 35 B.C. L. REV 141, 144 (1993). 
 102 Pub. L. No. 95-499 § 962(a), 94 Stat. 2650 (1980) (Boren Amendment); Pub. L. 
No. 97-35 § 2173, 95 Stat. 808 (1981); (Pub. L. No. 97-35 § 2174(a), 95 Stat. 809 
(1981)). 
 103 Pub. L. No. 95-499 § 962(a), 94 Stat. 2650 (1980) (Boren Amendment). 
 104 BARBARA A. ORMOND AND HEIDI KAPUSTKA, IMPACT OF BOREN AMENDMENT 
REPEAL ON HOSPITAL SERVICES FOR MEDICAID ELIGIBLES 6 (2003). 
 105 42 U.S.C. 1396a(30)(A); Watson, supra note 88, at 198–99. 
 106 42 U.S.C. 1396a(30)(A); Watson, supra note 88, at 198–99. 
 107 Compare 42 U.S.C. 1396a(30)(A) (noting that rates must be sufficient to enlist 
providers so that services are available under Medicaid to the extent available to the 
general population), with Pub. L. No. 95-499 § 962(a), 94 Stat. 2650 (1980) (noting rates 
must be “reasonable and adequate to meet the costs” of providers). 
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of § 30(A)  was found only in regulations and required that “payments 
must be sufficient to enlist enough providers so that services under the 
plan are available to recipients at least to the extent that those services 
are available to the general population.”108  Congress then acknowledged 
the lack of enforcement by inserting the language of the regulation into 
the Medicaid Act.109  Thus, § 30(A) requires that a state plan must: 
provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization 
of, and the payment for, care and services available under the 
plan . . .  as may be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary 
utilization of such care and services and to assure[110] that 
payments[111] are consistent[112] with efficiency, economy, and 
quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so 
that care and services are available under the plan at least to the 
extent that such care and services are available to the general 
population in the geographic area.113  
In order to measure a state’s compliance with the statute, the Secretary of 
HHS has urged the courts to apply a multifactor test.114  The availability 
of health services to the Medicaid population in a particular geographic 
area is compared to that of individuals with private or public insurance in 
the same area.115  The provision sets a floor for reimbursement rates by 
                                                                                                                                     
 108 42 C.F.R. § 447.204 (2010). 
 109 Ark. Med. Soc’y v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 526 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing H.R. Rep. 
No. 101-247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 389-90 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2060, 2115-16). 
 110 Rite Aid, Inc. v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 852 n.10 (3rd Cir. 1999) (quoting 
“‘Assure’ is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as ‘to make certain and put beyond 
doubt.  To . . . ensure positively.’  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 123 (6th ed. 1990).  
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “assure” similarly as ‘to make 
certain the coming or attainment of: ensure,’ in its sixth definition for the term.”  
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 133 (1986)). 
 111 Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood 235 F.3d 908, 932 n.31 (5th Cir. 
2000) (“We note that the statute in section 30(A) speaks in terms of payments, rather than 
rates. While a reimbursement rate is a form of payment, there are other types of payment 
to providers, such as those to DSHs and, possibly, co-payments made by recipients. 
These additional payments must also be taken into account in assessing whether the 
payments in the aggregate will be adequate.”). 
 112 Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1496 (9th Cir. 1997) (“‘Consistent’ 
means in agreement with, compatible, or conforming to the same principles or course of 
action. […] For payments to be consistent with efficiency, economy and quality of care, 
they must approximate the cost of quality care provided efficiently and economically.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 113 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(30)(A) (2006). For a general discussion see Watson, supra 
note 88. 
 114 Clark v. Kizer, 758 F. Supp. 572, 576 (E.D. Cal. 1990). 
 115 Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 390, reprinted in 1989 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1906, 2116; Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 
Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, Supplement D: Medical Assistance 
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requiring that rates are at least sufficient to ensure that providers are able 
to offer quality care116 and access117 to the Medicaid population equal to 
that of other individuals in the same market.118  The provision also 
imposes a ceiling on provider payments, requiring that payments are no 
more than what is efficient and economical.119  Fundamentally, § 30(A) 
provides states with a degree of flexibility in setting provider payments, 
but attempts to balance important stakeholder interests by protecting 
participating providers, eligible patients, and the federal budget.120 
Currently, the circuit courts are split regarding whether § 30(A) 
imposes a procedural or a substantive requirement.121  The Eighth122 and 
Ninth Circuits123 have held that § 30(A) requires states to conduct a study 
                                                                                                                                     
Programs (1966-67) Part 7-5340).   It is not clear, according to the circuit courts, whether 
Congress intended that the entity charged with ensuring compliance by making the 
comparative analysis is the Department of Health and Human Services, the state, or the 
court.  See Part IV, infra. 
 116 Bruce E. Landon, Eric C. Schneider, Sharon-Lise T. Normand, Sarah Hudson 
Scholle, Gregory Pawlson, & Arnold M. Epstein, Quality of Care in Medicaid Managed 
Care and Commercial Health Plans, 298 JAMA, 1674, 1674 (2007) (concluding that 
Medicaid managed care enrollees receive lower quality care than private pay enrollees). 
 117 Teresa A. Coughlin, Sharon K. Long & Yu –Chu Shen, Assessing Access to Care 
Under Medicaid: Evidence for the Nation and Thirteen States, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1073, 
1073 (2005) (noting that national analysis show that access to care among Mediciaid 
beneficiaries generally matches that of the privately insured, except for dental and 
prescription drugs, but also noting that state-level analysis shows more variation and 
presence of a gap in access). 
 118 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(30)(A); see Moncrieff, supra note 20, at 677. 
 119 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(30)(A); see Moncrieff, supra note 20, at 677. 
 120 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(30)(A).  Providers are ensured a sufficient rate of 
reimbursement, patients are ensured quality and access, and the federal government is 
ensured rates are not too high as to cover inefficient care.  Id. 
 121 Compare Ark. Med. Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 530 (8th Cir. 1993), 
Minn. Homecare Ass’n v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 917, 918 (8th Cir. 1997), and Orthopaedic 
Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998) 
(noting that § 30(A) is a procedural standard that requires a study) with Rite Aid, Inc. v. 
Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842 (3d Cir. 1999), Methodist Hosps, Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 
1030 (7th Cir. 1996), and Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 
933 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that § 30(A) is not procedural and does not require a study but 
only a substantive result). 
 122 Ark. Med. Soc’y v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 1993).  The Eighth Circuit 
held that Arkansas violated §30(A) “[b]ecause [the agency] failed to consider the rate 
reduction’s impact on equality of access, efficiency, economy, and quality of care,” and 
because its decision was driven by budgetary pressures.  Id. 
 123 Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F. 3d 1491, 1492 (9th Cir. 1997).  The Ninth 
Circuit held that in order to comply with § 30(A) , the state must consider the cost of 
quality care.  Id.  Thus, the state must “rely on responsible cost studies, its own or others’, 
which provide reliable data as a basis for its rate setting.”  Id.  Moreover, the rates 
adopted must “bear a reasonable relationship to efficient and economical hospitals’ costs 
of providing quality services, unless the state Department shows some justification for 
rates that substantially deviate from such costs.”  Id.  A budget shortfall is not sufficient 
to justify deviation from costs.  Id.  Because the state did not consider or study costs nor 
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or investigation regarding the impact of rate cuts in order to satisfy 
federal law.124  The  Eighth125 and Ninth Circuits126  looked to the 
purpose of §30(A)—to assure equal access to care—and suggested that 
this purpose could not possibly be assured if Medicaid reimbursement 
rates were driven by budgetary pressures and adopted without actually 
considering the impact of such a decision on the access to and quality of 
care.  Conversely, the Third127 and Seventh Circuits128 have held that the 
provision does not require procedural compliance, but instead requires 
that states achieve a substantive result.  The courts explained that the 
statute does not contain language that requires a particular procedure, 
consideration, or study with respect to access to care, but instead requires 
states to achieve a result, meaning state Medicaid rates must actually 
achieve equal access to care among Medicaid patients when compared to 
private pay patients in the same geographic area. 129   
The United States filed an amicus brief in early 2011 arguing that it 
was not necessary for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari regarding the 
interpretation of § 30(A) because HHS has agreed to issue an 
                                                                                                                                     
offer a justifiable excuse, the court held that the reimbursement rate-setting procedure 
violated § 30(A).  Id. 
 124 Ark. Med. Soc’y v. Reynolds, 6 F. 3d at 522; Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 
F.3d at1492. 
125  Ark. Med. Soc’y v. Reynolds, 6 F. 3d at 530–31.  
126  Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F. 3d at 1500.   
 127 Rite Aid, Inc. v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 850 (3rd Cir. 1999).  The court reasoned 
that the language of the statute is outcome-oriented and leaves states with the flexibility 
to set rates, as long as their decisions result in “substantive compliance with its specified 
factors of efficiency, economy, quality of care, and access.”  Id.  The Third Circuit, 
however, parted ways with the Seventh Circuit by holding that state rate setting decisions 
must not be arbitrary or capricious as to violate principles of administrative law, rejecting 
the view that a state could set rates like those in the private market and then respond to 
the rate’s effect on quality and access.  Id.  Therefore, while § 30(A) did not require states 
to consider costs or to rely on a study, under state agency principles, the decision must 
not arbitrary or capricious.  Id.  By failing to consider an important aspect of the issue or 
acting contrary to evidence, a state acts arbitrarily, but this does not suggest that a state 
must consider or study all factors.  Id.  Therefore, the Third Circuit interpreted § 30(A) as 
mandating only substantive compliance like the Seventh Circuit, whereas the principles 
of administrative law govern the procedural aspects the decision.  Id. 
 128 Methodist Hosps. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d at 1027.  The court held that that § 
30(A)contains no procedural requirement, because when compared to the Boren 
Amendment, which expressly required “findings,” the Equal Access provision is absent 
of similar language.  Id.  Moreover, the court suggested that it is almost impossible for a 
state to conduct a study to determine what effect a rate change will have, because a study 
will likely be flawed by dishonest answers and lack of cooperation.  Id.   Therefore, the 
court stated, the statutory language requires a state “to produce a result, not to employ 
any particular methodology for getting there.”  Id.    
129   Houstoun, 171 F.3d at 851–52; Methodist Hosps, 91 F.3d at 1030. 
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authoritative interpretation in the coming year interpreting the statute.130  
The rule may include, “a determination whether [§ ](30)(A) protects 
interests of providers at all following repeal of the Boren Amendment; 
what procedural or substantive requirements the statute imposes on 
States with respect to beneficiaries; and how the various provisions of  
[§ ](30)(A) and other Medicaid requirements interact.”131  The Supreme 
Court denied certiorari as to the interpretation of § 30(A), likely in 
response to the position of the United States regarding the commitment 
by HHS to issue a new interpretive rule.132  Notably, HHS issued a 
proposed rule on May 6, 2011, to “create a standardized, transparent 
process for States to follow as part of their broader efforts” to satisfy  
§ 30(A).133 
IV. ENFORCING THE EQUAL ACCESS PROVISION WITH 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
Enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
provides a mechanism to pursue civil remedies against state or local 
actors who violate federal rights.134  In Blessing v. Freestone,135 the 
Supreme Court adopted a three-part test to evaluate whether a statute 
creates enforceable rights.136  Under this test, when a court hears a § 
1983 suit in which the plaintiff alleges that a government actor violated 
federal rights created by a statute, the court must (1) examine whether 
Congress intended that the statute benefit the plaintiff, (2) determine 
whether the right is not so “vague and amorphous” as to strain judicial 
competence, and (3) assess whether the statute imposes an unambiguous 
obligation on the state.137  The Court further stated that a right asserted 
under a statute is only enforceable pursuant to § 1983 if it is “couched in 
mandatory rather than precatory terms.”138 
                                                                                                                                     
 130 Brief of United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Resondents, Maxwell-Jolly v. 
Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4190 (2010). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rosa Mem. Hosp., No. 10-283, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 735, 735 
(Jan. 18, 2011). 
 133 76 Fed. Reg. 26342 (May 6, 2011).   
 134 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”); see also Jane 
Perkins, Using § 1983 to Enforce Federal Laws, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. 
& POL’Y, 720, 720 (Mar./Apr. 2005). 
 135 520 U.S. 329 (1997). 
 136 Id.at 340–41.   
 137 Id.. 
 138 Id. at 341. 
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In 1990, the Supreme Court held in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital 
Association139 that a plaintiff could pursue a private cause of action under 
§ 1983 to enforce a state’s compliance with Medicaid’s Boren 
Amendment.140  The Court applied the Blessing test and said that “there 
can be little doubt that health care providers are the intended 
beneficiaries.”141  The Court further stated that “[t]he Boren Amendment 
is cast in mandatory rather than precatory terms: the state plan ‘must’ 
provide for payment . . . of hospitals according to rates the State finds are 
reasonable and adequate.”142  Finally, the Court observed that 
“[a]lthough some knowledge of the hospital industry might be required 
to evaluate a State’s findings with respect to the reasonableness of its 
rates, such an inquiry is well within the competence of the judiciary.”143   
The Court found that the Boren Amendment, with similar demands 
as § 30(A), created rights enforceable by private citizens under § 1983.144  
The Court also observed that “[t]he right is not merely a procedural one 
that rates be accompanied by findings and assurances (however 
perfunctory) of reasonableness and adequacy; rather the Act provides a 
substantive right to reasonable and adequate rates as well.”145  After the 
Wilder decision, which allowed private suits against states setting 
inadequate Medicaid rates, Congress eventually repealed the Boren 
Amendment; however, Wilder served as a seminal case for many 
Medicaid enforcement actions throughout the 1990s and persists as a 
seminal case for enforcing the Medicaid Act.146 
                                                                                                                                     
 139 496 U.S. 498 (1990). 
 140 Id. at 524. 
 141 Id. at 510.  Supporting the proposition that Congress intended that providers could 
file suit in federal court the Court noted that “in response to several States freezing their 
Medicaid payments to health care providers, Congress amended the Act in 1975 to 
require States to waive any Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit for violations of 
the Act.  Congress believed the waiver necessary because the existing means of 
enforcement—noncompliance procedures instituted by the Secretary or suits for 
injunctive relief by health care providers—were insufficient to deal with the problem of 
outright noncompliance because they included no compensation for past 
underpayments.”  Id. at 516–17. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 142 Id. at 512 (citations omitted). 
 143 Id. at 520. 
 144 Id. at 524. 
 145 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510.  
 146 Interestingly, Chief Justice John Roberts, acting as Deputy Solicitor General at the 
time, filed a brief in Wilder arguing that Medicaid’s Boren Amendment does not confer 
rights enforceable under § 1983.  See John Roberts’ Problematic Record on Disability 
Rights, The Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, 
http://www.bazelon.org/issues/disabilityrights/judicialnominees/roberts.htm (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2010). 
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 A. The Blessing Test 
Under the Blessing test, applied by the Supreme Court in Wilder, 
the circuit courts have consistently held that beneficiaries could pursue a 
cause of action pursuant to § 1983 when seeking to enforce § 30(A).147  
The circuit courts split when asked to determine whether providers could 
also file suit.148  For example, in Arkansas Medical Society v. 
Reynolds,149 the Eighth Circuit held that both providers and beneficiaries 
could pursue a cause of action under § 1983 to enforce § 30(A).150  The 
court reasoned that § 30(A) was intended to benefit providers because it 
pertains to the level of reimbursement rates, and Congress also intended 
to benefit beneficiaries by covering beneficiary access in the statute.151  
Thus, the first prong of the Blessing test was satisfied as to both 
providers and beneficiaries.152  The court stated that the mandatory 
obligation requirement of prong two was also satisfied because the 
language of the Medicaid Act expressly provided that a state “must” 
comply, which was “wholly uncharacteristic of a mere suggestion or 
nudge.”153  Finally, the court reasoned that § 30(A) was not too vague 
and amorphous as to strain judicial application because its legislative 
history was clear, many federal courts had already held that the provision 
was sufficiently specific, and when compared to the Boren Amendment 
which passed the Blessing test in Wilder, the language of § 30(A) was 
much less ambiguous.154 
Conversely, in Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood,155 
the Fifth Circuit held that providers could not file suit under § 1983.156  
                                                                                                                                     
 147 Long Term Care Pharm. Alliance v. Ferguson 362 F.3d 50 (2004); Ark. Med. 
Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1993); Visiting Nurse Ass’n v. Bullen, 93 
F.3d 997 (1st Cir. 1996); Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908 
(5th Cir. 2000). 
 148 Compare Walgreen Co. v. Hood, 275 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2001), and Pa. 
Pharmacists Ass’n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that providers are 
not intended beneficiaries and do not have a cause of action under 1983 to enforce 30(A) 
), with Visiting Nurse Ass’n of N. Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997 (1st Cir. 1996), 
Methodist Hosp., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026 (7th Cir. 1996), and Ark. Med. Soc’y, 
Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that providers have a cause of action 
under 1983 to enforce 30(A)).  See also Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (hearing and deciding in favor of a provider (hospital) based on 1983 cause of 
action seeking to enforce 30(A), but never addressing the hospital’s right to sue as a 
provider). 
 149 6 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 150 Id. at 526. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. (citations omitted). 
 154 Id. at 527. 
 155 235 F.3d 908 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 156 Id. at 928–29. 
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The Fifth Circuit applied the Blessing framework and concluded that the 
thrust of the statute was directed at patient access, and Congress only 
indirectly intended to benefit providers by ensuring that rates were set in 
a manner consistent with this goal.157  Therefore, because the Fifth 
Circuit held that providers, as opposed to beneficiaries, did not pass 
prong one of the Blessing test, the court held that they could not pursue 
claims under § 1983.158  The Fifth Circuit recognized, however, that “if 
the reimbursement rate reductions should result in the widespread demise 
of providers or discharge of Medicaid patients for fiscal reasons, the 
access of Medicaid recipients to care and services . . . may violate section 
30(A)’s command of equal access.”159  Yet, the court explained, under 
the Blessing test, “the fact that evidence of financial distress is relevant 
in a suit brought by Medicaid recipients does not amount to an individual 
entitlement on the part of any provider under the statute.”160  In 2002, the 
Supreme Court clarified the Blessing test, making judicial determinations 
regarding whether a statute creates an enforceable right under § 1983 
more consistent.  The new framework, however, has essentially 
eliminated the ability of both providers and beneficiaries to successfully 
pursue a cause of action enforcing § 30(A) under § 1983. 
B. The Impact of Gonzaga 
In Gonzaga v. Doe,161 the Supreme Court once again examined 
whether a cause of action was available under § 1983 to enforce rights 
created by federal law.162  The Washington Supreme Court held that the 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) “gives rise to a 
federal right enforceable under § 1983.”163  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve a split among state courts and the federal circuits and 
to clarify ambiguities in the Blessing test.164 
The Court first reviewed its prior decisions on the issue, explaining 
that the typical remedy for a state’s failure to comply with a Spending 
Clause statute is the termination of federal funds.165  Next, the Court 
stated that only twice has it held that Spending Clause legislation gives 
                                                                                                                                     
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 929. 
 160 Id. 
 161 536 U.S. 273 (2002). 
 162 Id.at 276.   
 163 Id.at 278.  
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 280. 
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rise to enforceable rights.166   Finally, the Court discussed ambiguities in 
its prior decisions167 and adopted a new test for determining whether a 
federal statute creates rights enforceable under § 1983.168 
According to the Gonzaga court, Congress must “speak with a clear 
voice and manifest an unambiguous intent to confer individual rights.”169  
In order to determine Congressional intent, the statute must be analyzed 
for “right-or duty-creating language” that benefits the challenging 
party.170  Next, rather than focusing on the aggregate population, a 
statutory provision must focus on the individual.171  Finally, a centralized 
enforcement mechanism – or “comprehensive remedial scheme” – in the 
statute at issue supports the finding that there is no individual right to 
pursue action under § 1983.172  Applying this framework, the Court held 
that FERPA does not create a statutory right enforceable under § 1983.173  
Since Gonzaga, several courts have similarly limited the availability of a 
private cause of action to enforce federal law either by concluding that a 
statute does not contain rights-creating language or focuses on an 
aggregate population rather than particular beneficiaries.174 
Post-Gonzaga, the circuits are split on whether a cause of action 
under § 1983 is viable when enforcing § 30(A).175  For example, the 
                                                                                                                                     
 166 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280 (citing Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. 
Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990)). 
 167 Id. at 282–83 (“[C]onfusion has led some courts to interpret Blessing as allowing 
plaintiffs to enforce a statute under § 1983 so long as the plaintiff falls within the general 
zone of interest that the statute is intended to protect . . . .   We now reject the notion that 
our cases permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of 
action brought under § 1983.”). 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 280. 
 170 Id. at 284 n.3 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979)). 
 171 Jane Perkins, Issue Brief: Update on Federal Court Access – Medicaid § 1983 and 
Preemption Cases, (Jan. 2007), www.nls.org/conf2007/1983%20preemption%20fact 
%20sheet.pdf. 
 172 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287 n.5. 
 173 Id. at 290.  As an interesting aside, Chief Justice Roberts, prior to his appointment 
to the Supreme Court, successfully argued Gonzaga before the Court.  See John Roberts’ 
Problematic Record on Disability Rights, The Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, 
http://www.bazelon.org/issues/disabilityrights/judicialnominees/roberts.htm (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2010). 
 174 Jon Donnenberg, Medicaid and Beneficiary Enforcement: Maintaining State 
Compliance with Federal Availability Requirements, 117 YALE L.J. 1498, 1520–21 
(2008); Jane Perkins, Using § 1983 to Enforce Federal Laws, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y. 720, 720 (Mar./Apr. 2005). 
 175 Compare Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2007), 
Mandy R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006), Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 
454 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2006), Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2005), and 
Long Term Care Pharm. Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2004) with Pediatric 
Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2006), 
vacated on other grounds, Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 551 U.S. 1142 (2007). 
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Eighth Circuit refused to overturn its pre-Gonzaga holding which 
allowed providers to file suit under § 1983 alleging that a state Medicaid 
agency violated § 30(A).176  The Eighth Circuit observed that Gonzaga 
did not overrule Wilder.177  Moreover, the court stated that the 
“proposition that the Medicaid Act may create enforceable rights, even 
for health care providers, is far from novel.”178  Finally, and perhaps even 
more importantly, the court interpreted § 30(A) under the Gonzaga 
framework and held that even after Gonzaga, the plaintiffs still prevailed 
because, among other things, Congress clearly intended for providers and 
beneficiaries to benefit.179   
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit readily overturned its pre-Gonzaga 
decision.   In Equal Access for El Paso v. Hawkins,180 the court noted the 
effect of Gonzaga and held that under the new framework, § 30(A) is not 
enforceable because the statute “speaks only to the state and the 
Secretary” and focuses on the aggregate rather than the individual.181  
Moreover, the court stated that the statute has a “systematic focus that 
deals with institutional policy and procedures, rather than an 
individualized focus concerned with whether the needs of any particular 
person or class of recipients have been satisfied.”182 
Since Gonzaga, the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and 
Tenth Circuits have ruled that there is no private right of action under  
§ 1983 when enforcing § 30(A).183  The door is not closed, however, as 
                                                                                                                                     
 176 Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 443 F.3d at 1015.  Pre-Gonzaga, the Eighth Circuit 
held that both providers and beneficiaries could file suit under § 1983.  Ark. Med. Soc’y, 
Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1993).   In Pediatric Specialty Care Inc., the state 
requested that the Eighth Circuit overturn this decision to accommodate the Supreme 
Court’s restrictive Gonzaga analysis and the court refused.  443 F. 3d 1005, 1015 (8th 
Cir. 2006).  First, the Eighth Circuit observed that Gonzaga was issued on June 20, 2002, 
and while its decision was filed ten days before Gonzaga, its mandate did not issue until 
July 2002.  Id.  “Thus, Gonzaga [was] not an intervening decision of a superior tribunal, 
as is required before we may overturn matters previously settled as the law of the case.”  
Id.  Therefore, the court could not, as a matter of precedent and procedure, overturn its 
decision regarding the ability to enforce § 30(A).  Id. 
 177 Id.; see also Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990). 
 178 Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 443 F.3d at1015. 
 179 Id. 
 180 509 F. 3d 697 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 181 Id. at 703. 
 182 Id. at 704.  The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision which relied on 
the pre-Gonzaga precedent.  Id. The Fifth Circuit then remanded the claim with direction 
to dismiss with prejudice.  Id.  The plaintiffs in Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. also 
asserted a Supremacy Clause claim in the same case before the Fifth Circuit, yet the Fifth 
Circuit did not address the claim and remanded with direction to dismiss with prejudice.  
Id.  Also, the district found in favor of the plaintiffs on the § 1983 claim, but strangely 
predicts reversal on appeal due to the Gonzaga decision.  Id. 
 183 Compare Long Term Care Pharm. Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 56–59 (1st 
Cir. 2004), N.Y. Ass’n of Homes & Servs. for the Aging, Inc. v. DeBuono, 444 F.3d 147, 
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the Eighth Circuit adamantly refused to let Gonzaga stand in the way of 
provider and beneficiary rights under the Medicaid Act.184  
Notwithstanding, as the ability to enforce rights under the Medicaid Act 
narrows, providers and beneficiaries have since pursued new legal 
theories when seeking to ensure state compliance. 
V. EQUAL ACCESS AND THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE 
Medicaid providers and beneficiaries are now successfully pursuing 
suits to enforce § 30(A) under the Supremacy Clause, reaffirming the 
binding obligations of Medicaid on all states that choose to participate in 
the program.185  The Medicaid Act is the supreme law of the land and   
Medicaid’s Equal Access provision requires that states provide equal 
access to quality care by setting reimbursement rates at an adequate level 
to entice providers to participate.186  If a state refuses to comply by acting 
contrary to the statute, its actions conflict with federal law.187  Where 
state and federal laws conflict, the federal law prevails.188  Thus, if a state 
reimburses providers at rates that are insufficient to assure quality and 
access, the state is in violation of federal law and the unlawful state 
action must be enjoined.189    
A.  The Supremacy Clause 
The Supremacy Clause states that the “Constitution, and the Laws 
of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”190  
Unlike claims under § 1983 that involve securing a right to individuals, 
                                                                                                                                     
148 (2d Cir. 2006), Pa. Pharmacists, 283 F.3d at 541–42, Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. 
v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 702–03 (5th Cir. 2007), Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 
F.3d 532, 541–43 (6th Cir. 2006), Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 
2005), and Mandy R. ex rel. Mr. & Mrs. R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1146–48 (10th Cir. 
2006), with Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005 
(8th Cir. 2006), vacated on other grounds, Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 551 
U.S. 1142 (2007). 
 184 Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 443 F.3d at 1015. But, see Minn. Pharm. Ass’n v. 
Pawlenty, 690 F. Supp. 2d 809, 816 (D. Minn. 2010) (refusing to allow a § 1983 suit to 
enforce § 30(A) despite the holding in Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Arkansas 
Department of Human Services). 
 185 Supra, note 184. 
 186 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(30)(A) (2006). 
 187 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 
1050, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 188 Federal law and regulations have the same pre-emptive effect.  See Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982). 
 189 Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 543 F.3d at 1065. 
 190 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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preemption involves protecting the nation’s federal structure.191  Courts 
apply a different standard when analyzing preemption claims.192  
Jurisdiction under preemption theory does not invoke the Gonzaga 
analysis; thus, providers and beneficiaries can successfully pursue a 
cause of action under this theory as an alternative to § 1983.193 
The Supreme Court, in PHRMA v. Walsh,194 implicitly affirmed the 
theory that state law can be preempted by the Medicaid Act.195  In 
PHRMA, the plaintiff alleged that a state regulation that required pre-
authorization for prescription drugs was preempted by the Medicaid 
statute.196  Without expressly addressing preemption jurisdiction, the 
plurality reached the merits of the case, thus implicitly affirming the 
court’s jurisdiction.197   
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether § 30(A) 
preempts state law.  Circuit courts, however, have enforced § 30(A) 
under the Supremacy Clause, applying a conflict by implication 
analysis.198  Under this theory, the challenging party bears the burden of 
overcoming the presumption of a state statute’s validity, which can be 
done here by showing an actual conflict with § 30(A).”199  According to 
extensive Supreme Court precedent and decisions by the circuits, a cause 
of action exists to enjoin a state from implementing legislation in 
violation of federal law.200  The remedy for this cause of action, however, 
is limited.201  Unlike a cause of action under § 1983, which can result in 
the payment of civil penalties and attorneys fees, plaintiffs filing suit 
                                                                                                                                     
 191 Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 117 (1989); Verizon 
Maryland Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635 (2002).   
 192 Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at 117.   
 193 For an in depth discussion, please see Rochelle Bobroff, § 1983 and Preemption: 
An Alternative Means of Court Access For Safety Net Statutes, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 27 
(2008); SARAH SOMERS, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, PREEMPTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
MEDICAID (National Health Law Program May 21, 2007). 
 194 538 U.S. 644 (2003) (plurality).  See also Arkansas Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 547 U.S. 268 (2006) (holding Medicaid Act preempts state law).   
 195 Planned Parenthood v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d at 331–32 (citing Walsh, 538 U.S. at 
661–68). 
 196 Walsh, 538 U.S. at 675.   
 197 Id. at 661–69. 
 198 According to preemption doctrine, state laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to 
the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the Constitution” are preempted.  Gibbons v. 
Ogden 22 U.S. 1, 9 (1824).  In order to determine whether preemption exists, the court 
must first examine Congressional intent.  Id.  A state’s actions can be preempted by 
express statutory language, by implication from a congressional scheme, or by 
implication from conflict.  Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 201 Bobroff, supra note 194; Somers, supra note 194. 
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under the Supremacy Clause are generally afforded only prospective 
injunctive relief.202 
B. The Rise of Medicaid Preemption 
The Eighth Circuit, in Lankford v. Sherman,203 concluded that a 
preemption claim to enforce Medicaid’s requirements was viable even in 
the absence of a cognizable § 1983 claim.204  The court examined a 
plaintiff’s attempt to enforce Medicaid’s comparability and reasonable-
standards requirements under both § 1983 (post-Gonzaga) and the 
Supremacy Clause.205   Applying the Blessing test and the constricting 
standards of Gonzaga, the court concluded that the plaintiff had no  
§ 1983 cause of action.206   
The court then addressed the viability of a preemption claim and 
expressly noted that preemption claims afford plaintiffs an alternative 
theory of relief because they are analyzed under a different legal 
framework than § 1983 claims.207  Moreover, the Supremacy Clause 
requires that when states choose to accept the benefits of Spending 
Clause legislation they must comply with federal requirements.  208  
Therefore, even if no cause of action exists under § 1983, the Eighth 
Circuit concluded it was free to examine state compliance with federal 
law under the Supremacy Clause.209  The Fifth Circuit followed, holding 
that providers “have an implied cause of action to seek injunctive relief 
from a state statute purportedly preempted by federal Spending Clause 
legislation.”210  So far, all circuit courts that have addressed the issue 
have held that the Medicaid Act is the supreme law of the land and 
presumptively affords a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause. 211 
                                                                                                                                     
 202 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008) (noting well-
established framework for injunctive relief which requires a showing of a likelihood of 
success on the merits, irreparable harm, that the balance of equities are in the moving 
parties favor, and that the relief is in the public interest). 
 203 451 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 204 Id. at 500. 
 205 Id. at 500.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(B), (a)(17) (2006). 
 206 Lankford, 451 F.3d at 509. 
 207 Id. (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 108 (1989)). 
 208 Id. at 510. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Planned Parenthood v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 325 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 211 Compare Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1060–61 
(9th Cir. 2008), Sanchez, 403 F.3d at 331–32, Lankford v. Sherman,451 F. 3d at 496, 
with Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 704 (5th Cir. 2007).  In 
Equal Access, the plaintiffs asserted Supremacy Clause and § 1983 claims and the court 
held that no § 1983 cause of action existed, yet completely ignored and never addressed 
the Supremacy Clause claim and remanded the case for dismissal with prejudice. 509 
F.3d at 704.  
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The Second and Ninth Circuits have both addressed whether  
§ 30(A) in particular can be enforced pursuant to preemption theory.  In 
Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc. v. Shewry,212 a 
group of providers and beneficiaries challenged California’s plan to cut 
provider reimbursement by 10%.213  The district court dismissed the 
claim, holding that § 30(A) does not confer rights under the Gonzaga 
framework, and therefore, the claim also failed under the Supremacy 
Clause.214  The Ninth Circuit reversed, noting that “[t]he Supreme Court 
has repeatedly entertained claims for injunctive relief based on federal 
preemption, without requiring that the standards for bringing suit under  
§ 1983 be met.”215  Moreover, the court stated “even as the Supreme 
Court has tightened the requirements for seeking damages under § 1983, 
it has consistently reaffirmed the availability of injunctive relief to 
prevent state officials from implementing state legislation allegedly 
preempted by federal law.”216  The court concluded that its decision 
“simply reaffirm[ed] over a century’s worth of precedent.”217  The Ninth 
Circuit was the first court to hold that a cause of action under the 
Supremacy Clause is available when seeking to enforce § 30(A). 
It must be emphasized that the statutory remedies available under  
§ 1983 are no longer available.218  For example, a cause of action based 
on § 1983 includes legal damages and attorney’s fees for successful 
plaintiffs, while a preemption cause of action generally affords neither.219  
Moreover, courts interpreted the Medicaid Act, including § 30(A) pre-
Gonzaga, analyzing it under the § 1983 framework.  Now that the cause 
of actions differs, courts have been urged to reinterpret § 30(A).  The 
Ninth Circuit dismissed this argument on several grounds.220  HHS 
recently issued a proposed rule clarifying the requirements of § 30(A) 
and potentially resolving the current circuit split.221  The Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                                     
 212 543 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 213 Id. at 1052. 
 214 Id. at 1054. 
 215 Id. at 1055. 
 216 Id. at 1063. 
 217 Id. at 1066. 
 218 Pa. Pharm. Ass’n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 536 n.5 (3rd Cir. 2002) (Becker, C.J. 
dissenting) (noting that attorney fees are available to a successful § 1983 plaintiff). 
 219 Id. 
 220 In Independent Living Center v. Maxwell Jolly,  the Ninth Circuit adopted its pre-
Gonzaga interpretation of the § 30(A), amid extensive challenges by the state.  572 F.3d 
644, 653–57 (9th Cir. 2009).  The court stated that “[t]he Director has not provided any 
coherent reason why the purpose underlying § 30(A) would be different for purposes of 
federal preemption than it was for direct enforcement under § 1983, and we see none.” Id. 
at 653.  
221  76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26343 (May 6, 2011) The proposed rule requires states to 
consider access data prior and to collect input from patients and providers before 
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has granted certiorari to determine whether providers and beneficiaries 
can file suit under the Supremacy Clause to enforce § 30(A), which may 
significantly impact access to care.222 
VI. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: HEALTH REFORM AND EQUAL ACCESS 
The Affordable Care Act expands the role of states in providing 
health care to low-income populations, making it crucial that states 
administer Medicaid in compliance with federal law.  States must adopt 
rates that assure access to care if the goals of the reform legislation are to 
be realized.  The circuit split addressed supra demonstrates the 
difficulties faced by providers and patients as to whether Congressional 
demands under the Medicaid statute are even enforceable, due to the 
varying jurisdictional requirements and the statute’s ambiguities.  
Moreover, the broad and undefined language of § 30(A) provides little 
guidance to state policy-makers which has in turn led to rate cuts and 
decreased access. 
In response to the courts’ retreat from § 1983, a legislative response 
is necessary to ensure that states comply with Medicaid’s minimum 
requirements and to ensure that all citizens receive adequate access to 
care.  If Congress fails to act, Medicaid’s expansion will likely result in a 
large number of newly enrolled beneficiaries with limited access to care.  
Congress must expressly declare that the Medicaid Act affords both 
providers and beneficiaries rights that can be enforced against states that 
fail to comply with the statute’s substantive requirements.  Congress 
must also provide states with the option to adopt federal rates that are set 
by HHS, which will in turn relieve states of liability for rate-making 
decisions.  Finally, Congress must provide incentives for states to 
monitor compliance and achieve quality and access similar to the 
framework provided used to implement accountable care organizations. 
A. Private Enforcement 
A private right of action is necessary to ensure that states comply 
with Medicaid’s requirements.  A private right of action encourages 
provider participation by creating a mechanism to recoup financial 
                                                                                                                                     
reducing or restricting Medicaid rates.  Id. at 26361–62.  States must submit to CMS an 
analysis of Medicaid rates and their impact on access to care, which CMS can disapprove 
or take compliance action.  Id. States must also conduct ongoing access reviews and 
when access issues are identified a corrective action plan with specific steps and 
timelines must be submitted to address the issue within 90 days of discovery.  Id.     
 222 Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rosa Mem. Hosp., No. 10-283, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 735, 735 
(Jan. 18, 2011). 
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damages incurred as a result of accepting Medicaid patients at below-
cost rates.  The private cause of action is a safety net for those 
contemplating participation in the program.  Currently, providers have no 
guarantee that they will not suffer tremendous financial loss by 
volunteering to participate in Medicaid. 
Moreover, a private right of action provides security to Medicaid 
beneficiaries and in part, serves to eliminate the stigma of being enrolled 
in a welfare program.  For example, under the current system, low-
income patients face tremendous legal hurdles when seeking medical 
assistance.  Unfortunately, neither the federal nor state governments are 
monitoring state compliance.223  Thus, patients are ignored with a bus 
ticket to nowhere and no recourse to recoup financial losses that may 
have occurred when states violate the law by limiting access to care.  A 
private right of action sends the message that beneficiaries are important, 
and if their rights are ignored, the state will compensate those in need. 
Furthermore, enacting a private cause of action is a fiscally 
conservative approach that will result in long-term savings for the federal 
government.  The private cause of action, similar to a qui tam suit under 
the False Claims Act,224 empowers patients and providers to monitor the 
use of federal funds by financially strapped states.  By allowing patients 
and providers to police state compliance, Medicaid must be administered 
efficiently in order to protect against watered-down programs that delay 
access resulting in costly care.  The private cause of action puts the 
ability to help enforce the law in the hands of those affected by state 
decisions and forces states to pay attention to those who need care. 
Although some plaintiffs have experienced success pursuing a 
cause of action under the Supremacy Clause, this too may deteriorate, as 
two Justices have stated that this path to compliance is not viable when 
enforcing Spending Clause legislation.225  Moreover, preemption claims 
do not allow recovery of legal damages or attorney’s fees.226  Thus, when 
states cut Medicaid rates, resulting in extended wait or travel times to 
                                                                                                                                     
223  According to a new rule proposed by HHS, states will be required to submit access 
data to CMS when restructuring or reducing Medicaid rates.  76 Fed. Reg. 26361–62 
(May 6, 2011).  The rule would also require states to consider input from beneficiaries 
and stakeholders.  Id.  Finally, the rule will require that states and the federal 
governments monitor access issues.  Id.         
 224 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006). 
 225 Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 675, 683 (2003) (Scalia, 
J. concurring) (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas expressed 
serious doubts as to the availability of a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause 
when seeking to enforce Spending Clause legislation.  Id.  Accordingly, both Justices 
suggested that the only remedy available when states violate Spending Clause legislation 
is the withdrawal of federal funds.  Id. 
 226 Bobroff, supra note 194. Somers, supra note 194. 
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access care, states are not financially liable to the affected beneficiaries.  
Under the preemption theory, rate cuts may be enjoined, but physicians 
and beneficiaries receive no compensation for filing suit, pursuing an 
appeal, or accepting Medicaid patients at unlawful rates.  Thus, the 
Supremacy Clause cause of action does not encourage provider 
participation and provides little recourse for beneficiaries.  Without a 
private cause of action, states are free to violate the law and restrict 
access with little to no consequence. 
Congress should enact a private cause of action to allow providers 
and beneficiaries to enforce the Medicaid Act and its regulations.  This 
private right would alleviate the legal burdens faced by patients and 
providers, and provide each a day in court.  The private right should 
allow for attorney’s fees and legal damages, to assure provider 
participation and guard against uncompensated time spent on waiting 
lists or travelling across the state to access care often experienced by 
Medicaid beneficiaries.  Additionally, the threat of legal damages and 
attorney’s fees deters unlawful state action and fosters a cooperative and 
attentive relationship among states, providers, and beneficiaries.  Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, the private cause of action ensures that 
federal money is spent according to federal guidelines, thus resulting in 
full-strength programs that live up to the goals of reform. 
B. Universal Rates and Accountable Care 
In addition to the private cause of action, Congress should provide 
states with the option of adopting rates set at the federal level.  By 
adopting the federal rates, states would be relieved from liability incurred 
under the private cause of action.  The federal Medicaid rates should be 
equal to Medicare rates for services reimbursed under Medicare.  For 
those services not reimbursed under Medicare, such as certain types of 
costly long-term care, HHS should examine current state rates and adjust 
for quality and access measures.  The universal rates should cut down on 
administrative inefficiencies and financial inequity, thus improving 
provider participation and beneficiary access.  Moreover, rate 
consistency across public programs would help eliminate, to a certain 
extent, the ability to shift costs between public and private payers.       
The Affordable Care Act contains numerous provisions that focus 
on payment strategies to reduce costs and improve access, and Medicaid 
and Medicare universal rates should be a primary focus.  Under the 
Affordable Care Act, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation 
(“the Innovation Center”) was created to “test innovative payment and 
service delivery models to reduce program expenditures . . . while 
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preserving or enhancing the quality of care furnished to individuals.”227  
Like § 30(A), the Innovation Center also seeks to improve access, 
increase quality, and promote efficient care. 
As part of its quality and efficiency studies, the Center should 
develop a universal rate system that ties Medicaid reimbursement to 
Medicare reimbursement, similar to the way in which the Affordable 
Care Act seeks to provide equal access to primary care physicians.  
Under such a system, access would improve and states would be relieved 
of financial liability under a private cause of action as they would no 
longer control rates.  In addition to decreasing administrative obstacles at 
the provider level, such a system would promote efficiency by 
eliminating duplication among rate setting agencies.  For example, under 
the new rule proposed by HHS, both the federal and state governments 
will be responsible for monitoring and adjusting rates to ensure access to 
care.  If federal rates are adopted, states would no longer be required to 
adjust payments, eliminating an administrative cost at the state level.   
Over time, additional costs could be eliminated by reducing 
duplication and administrative barriers experienced by providers 
participating in both Medicare and Medicaid.  For example, program 
reform should focus on efficiency by streamlining conditions of 
participation, forms, codes, and additional administrative measures into a 
single administrative body.  Such a system would eliminate current 
inefficiencies which require providers and beneficiaries to navigate the 
federal and state framework when seeking reimbursement for care.  
Finally, the system would promote equality between Medicare and 
Medicaid beneficiaries throughout the country, eliminating the stigma of 
Medicaid.  Rather than focusing on setting rates to assure access to care, 
the legislative focus at the state level would turn toward improving 
efficiency and quality while decreasing costs.   
The federal government should also provide states with a new 
incentive to manage and monitor the care provided across Medicaid 
programs.  In order to do so, states should be rewarded or penalized 
based on their ability to administer the program efficiently and their 
ability to meet certain quality and access measures.  Thus, states under 
this system will in essence become Accountable Care Organizations 
(ACO) as developed under the Affordable Care Act.228  An ACO is “an 
organization of health care providers that agrees to be accountable for the 
quality, cost, and overall care of Medicare beneficiaries.”229  ACO 
                                                                                                                                     
 227 Affordable Care Act § 3021 (2010). 
 228 Id. § 3022. 
 229 CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE “ACCOUNTABLE 
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participants are eligible for a portion of shared savings payments 
attributed to increased efficiency and coordination of care provided that 
quality benchmarks are satisfied.230  The ACO concept should be 
expanded to include the coordination of care provided to Medicaid 
beneficiaries. 
For example, when developing a statewide ACO, the federal 
government could provide incentives for states (based on federal 
benchmarks) which might include increased FMAP or funding for 
additional services or even the ability of the state to keep any cost 
savings due to efficiency efforts.  Federal benchmarks would include 
access and quality goals similar to those imposed by § 30(A).  States that 
meet these goals would be eligible for incentive payments, just like 
groups of providers would be eligible for shared savings as part of an 
ACO.  The program would give states flexibility to implement their 
Medicaid programs but would also require close federal oversight to 
monitor the extent to which states achieve the goals of Medicaid and 
health reform.  A statewide ACO would also eliminate many of the fraud 
and abuse issues and anti-trust concerns confronting providers under the 
current ACO program.   
New Jersey has proposed an ACO demonstration project to 
encourage efficiency and decrease costs among Medicaid providers.231  
Under this program, Medicaid providers in an ACO would be eligible for 
shared savings payments similar to the payments distributed under the 
Medicare ACO program.232  States across the country could adopt similar 
programs, or the federal government could expand its ACO program to 
include Medicaid providers.  Ultimately, however, states (in addition to 
groups of providers) should be held accountable for providing access to 
quality care for Medicaid beneficiaries.  A federal program that treats 
states as ACOs may be the best way to promote accountability for equal 
care.   
In sum, a move towards federal rates may encourage the 
development of innovative programs among the states that focus on the 
efficiency and economy of care they provide.  The option proposed here 
allows states to retain the flexibility they currently have when adopting 
Medicaid reimbursement rates.  It also allows providers and beneficiaries 
to file suit against states if rates are not set within the parameters of 
federal law.  State rate-setting decisions should be measured by 
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substantive results, which should be clarified by Congress or HHS in 
objective measurable terms.  A state’s ability to provide access to 
quality, economical, and efficient care should be measured according to 
similar, objective standards adopted by regulation for ACOs.  Moreover, 
if states choose to adopt federal Medicaid rates, states should be relieved 
from future liability under a private cause of action by patients and 
providers seeking to enforce § 30(A).  A system that seeks to streamline 
the provision of medical assistance under both federal and state programs 
may actually encourage provider participation and leaves open the option 
of rewarding states (as ACOs) for structuring Medicaid programs in 
order to achieve quality and efficiency goals. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Medicaid has been widely out of favor according to many 
Americans due to its lack of quality and access.  Medicare, on the other 
hand, is a sacred entitlement and private insurance is viewed by some as 
the ultimate path to accessible, quality care.  Congress enacted 
Medicaid’s Equal Access provision to ensure that states set rates so that 
inequities between private and public programs did not occur.  
Unfortunately, issues of quality and access have been left to the states 
and the federal courts.  Although difficult, Congress must revise and 
enact measurable standards to fix its past shortcomings and to assure that 
states provide an accessible safety net. 
Due to the economic recession and recent reform measures, 
Medicaid will play a larger role in providing care to low income 
Americans.  The federal government has generously extended funds to 
encourage states to establish Medicaid programs, yet federal standards 
are either too flexible or states are not being held accountable for the care 
they are required to provide.  Many states are taking advantage of this 
flexibility by cutting reimbursement rates to balance budgets.  
Additionally, the courts have had difficulty interpreting the language of 
the statute, which provides insufficient guidance.  In turn, providers and 
beneficiaries have been required to overcome immense legal hurdles to 
assure that states provide medical assistance according to federal law. 
In response, Congress should extend a private right of action to 
Medicaid providers and beneficiaries by clearly expressing its intent to 
create a right to access medical assistance.  As a complementary 
alternative to requiring that states achieve substantive results, Congress 
should develop a universal rate system for its public programs.  This 
option would relieve state liability under § 30(A) and move the nation 
one step closer towards equal access to care among both low-income and 
elderly populations.  Finally, the Accountable Care Organization concept 
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should be expanded to include Medicaid providers as well as the states.  
The federal government should provide incentives for providing equal 
access to quality care and the states should do the same with respect to 
encouraging efficiency among Medicaid providers.  These actions clarify 
multiple circuit splits and protect states, providers, beneficiaries, and the 
federal budget, and bolster the goals of health reform. 
 
